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Abstract: We consider the design space available for social robots in terms of a hierarchy of 
functional definitions: the essential properties in terms of a locus of interaction, autonomy, 
intelligence, awareness of humans as possessors of mental state, and awareness of humans as 
social interactors. We also suggest that the emphasis on physical embodiment in some segments 
of the social robotics community has obscured commonalities with a class of agents that are 
identical in all other respects. These definitions naturally suggest research issues, directions, and 
possibilities which we explore. Social robotics also lacks compelling ‘killer apps’ which we 
suggest would help focus the community on a research agenda. 
“A machine capable of carrying out a complex series of actions 
automatically, especially one programmable by a computer” 
“A machine that resembles a human and does mechanical, routine tasks 
on command” 
 
“Any machine or mechanical device that operates automatically with 
humanlike skill” 
“A machine resembling a human being and able to replicate certain 
human movements and functions automatically” 
“Devices that possesses some of these capabilities: accept electronic 
programming, process data or physical perceptions electronically, 
operate autonomously to some degree, move around, operate physical 
parts of itself or physical processes, sense and manipulate their 
environment, and exhibit intelligent behavior — especially behavior 
which mimics humans or other animals” 
As these online dictionary definitions of ‘robot’ show, there is considerable confusion about 
what exactly the term ‘robot’ is supposed to mean. They attempt to blend two quite disparate 
underlying concepts: a device that perform physical actions, while at the same time resembling a 
human. 
Definitions in the more-formal literature are not much clearer: 
“A reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator designed to move 
material, parts, tools, or specialized devices through various 
programmed motions for the performance of a variety of tasks” credited 
to the Robot Institute of America, 1979. 
“An automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose, 
manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which may be either 
fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications” 
ISO8373 (https://www.iso.org/standard/55890.html) 
“A robot is a constructed system that displays both physical and mental 
agency, but is not alive in the biological sense.” (Richards and Smart, 
2013) 
“A social robot is an autonomous or semi-autonomous robot that 
interacts and communicates with humans by following the behavioral 
norms expected by the people with whom the robot is intended to 
interact.” (Bartneck and Forlizzi, 2004) 
The Richards and Smart definition, especially, seems to get closer to a working definition of a 
robot as it is conceived in the research community. However, it is broader than some researchers 
would agree with because it does not explicitly require embodiment. 
In the closest work to what we attempt here, in 2004, Bartneck and Forlizzi attempted to define a 
design-centered framework for social robots. Their definition of a social robot is given above. 
They concluded that social robots could be categorised along five dimensions: form (abstract to 
anthropomorphic), modality (range of communication channels used), social norms 
(understanding of social expectations), autonomy, and interactivity (ability to respond to human 
behaviour). From these properties they derived design guidelines which, in the end, are rather 
weak: e.g. “The form of a social robot should match its abilities”. Breazeal et al. (2008) 
categorise social robots by whether they display paralinguistic information (non-verbal aspects 
of communication), whether they understand paralinguistic information, whether they include 
emotion in interactions, and whether they can build and exploit a theory of mind for humans and 
other robots with which they interact. Hegel et al. (2009) take a semiotic view of social robotics, 
categorising the design space for robots by form, function, and context, further subdividing 
function into practical function, aesthetic function, and indicating functions. 
Our goal is more ambitious. We suggest, and motivate, definitions of the properties that, first, 
differentiate robot-like systems from other software/hardware systems and, second, differentiate 
between less- and more-powerful kinds of robot-like systems. Good definitions need to be 
precise enough that they accurately characterise the system they reference; when they are precise 
enough they naturally suggest research directions, which we also explore. 
Because of ambiguities about the extent to which the systems we are defining must be embodied, 
we use the term agent/robot, aware that it is a clunky phrase. We must also contrast what we 
defining with respect to the more general concept of ‘agent’ (Poole and Mackworth, 2016). In 
that community, an agent is anything that has agency, that is which is purposive, possessing 
goals and/or preferences and means to work towards them. This definition includes living things 
as well as artificial agents. Furthermore, the agent community defines intelligence in terms of 
appropriateness for goal seeking, flexibility, and learning. This definition seems too general – a 
single-celled creature is intelligent according to it and, in software terms, it includes the analytic 
tool that predicts whether a credit card transaction should be approved or not. The agent 
community also rules out systems that exist only to think; but this seems perverse. However, the 
agent community has made great progress with designing and implementing world models, 
hierarchical planning, and learning, all of which deserve to be more widely used in the robotics 
community. 
Ordinary software/hardware systems have revolutionised the world in the last 70 years. They can 
be divided into three main categories: those that do not interact with humans directly (for 
example, network switches), those that interact with humans via information flow (most 
software), and those that interact with the physical world (for example, Roombas). These 
distinctions continue to have a role in the world of agent/robots. 
What is it that agent/robots can do that such conventional systems cannot? The main answers 
seem to be that they are easier to direct (because they will understand what we want without 
detailed instructions); they are general-purpose (so that they will replace the affordances of many 
current systems, as cell phones have replaced many different portable devices); and they can 
manipulate the physical world in ways that are beyond current, m ore specialised systems (for 
example, becoming personal support workers, cleaners, or firefighters). However, one of the 
missing pieces in robotics research is a clear sense of the ‘killer apps’ for such systems. 
Agreement about some set of these would provide a crisper focus for research. 
In any research area, good definitions clarify the landscape of what has been done, and the 
research questions that remain to be answered. The following definitions attempt to capture the 
key ideas in the design space of ‘social robotics’. We begin with the basic differentiator from 
conventional software/hardware systems. 
Definition: An agent/robot is a system for which a locus of interaction with the real-world is a 
critical property. 
This definition implies that such a system has to be embodied in at least a virtual sense; the 
system must ‘inhabit’ something. Since agent/robots are specifically physically located at any 
moment in time, they are not interchangeable with one another – they have some form of 
individuality since a system whose locus of interaction is here cannot be the same as one whose 
locus of interaction is there. An agent/robot is therefore a kind of converse of other systems and 
applications, which are identical to one another, and often available from anywhere. A web 
server does not have a locus of interaction. 
An agent has a locus of interaction within some other device or physical location. The common 
cases are a locus within a mobile device such as a cell phone, or a locus within a specific room, 
where it interacts via cameras, microphones, speakers, and screens. An agent has a mental 
embodiment. 
A robot has a locus of interaction in a specialised physical construct. This may be fixed (for 
example, a robotic concierge) or mobile. A robot is embodied in a stronger sense – it has both a 
mental and a physical embodiment. 
The key property of an agent/robot is the notion of place: it is a software/hardware systems that 
operates in a specific ‘location’, and interacting with it requires that you go to it, or it comes to 
you. Such systems are not necessarily sophisticated just because they have a locus of interaction. 
For example, an industrial assembly robot is just a piece of software with an unusual output 
device – but its outputs only make sense in a specific location. A transit tap-on-tap-off system in 
a bus is quite a simple agent, but its (current) location is key to its functionality. 
For systems closer to what is conceived, at least in the popular mind, as robots extra properties 
are needed. 
Definition: An agent/robot is autonomous if, as well as an assigned task list, it has self-generated 
(including homeostatic) tasks AND it has a regulatory system to manage (order) both kinds of 
tasks together by internally defined importance. 
Of course, any system has the ability to understand commands and, if it is to be useful, to carry 
out these commands. The new capability of an autonomous system is that it can generate 
usefulness without, or beyond, commands it has been given, by carrying out tasks that need not 
be given to it explicitly. An autonomous agent/robot is therefore capable of surprising the 
humans in its vicinity. 
Because such a system has two different kinds of tasks to carry out, new issues arise in deciding 
what priority to give them; hence the need for a sophisticated regulatory system. 
A system whose only self-generated tasks are homeostatic should probably not be considered 
autonomous. For example, operating systems such as Windows regularly check for updates, and 
download and install them without user intervention but this is not enough to be considered 
autonomous. High-performance computational systems such as database query engines monitor 
their own performance and predict upcoming resource demands, adjusting their configurations, 
so it is appropriate to consider them as autonomous, but they are not agent/robots. 
An autonomous agent has mental agency; an autonomous robot has both mental and physical 
agency. 
We have already indicated that a locus of interaction creates a specific identity for each instance 
of an agent/robot, since they each interact with the outside world in distinct places. The 
definition of autonomy strengthens this notion of identity since the actions of an individual 
system, once it has begun to operate, change its state with respect to the ordering of future 
actions. An autonomous system is more stateful than a conventional system or, to put it another 
way, an autonomous system learns in at least a simple sense. Thus systems with identical 
software and hardware configurations, while already different by being embodied in (a set of) 
different locations, diverge as the result of the feedback loops between their regulatory system 
choices, and the outcomes of the chosen actions. 
Therefore, hard rebooting an autonomous agent/robot (i.e. without state preservation) produces a 
new instance. 
There are very few examples of autonomous systems in this sense in existence, and they tend to 
have been designed to operate in constrained environments where the task possibilities are 
limited, and so the regulation process is manageable. There is also perhaps a pragmatic 
difficulty: conventional software can be replicated with low marginal cost, but this is less true for 
an autonomous agent/robot. 
Definition: An autonomous agent/robot is intelligent if its regulatory system prevents it from 
getting stuck. 
This definition implies that, as well as techniques such as generalized timeouts, the system 
predicts the consequences of its actions and uses this to determine their scheduling (endo-
prediction). Thus it is capable of, for example, determining the energy cost of an action and not 
carrying it out if to do so would leave it unable to recharge. 
This idea of not getting stuck is not intended to (somehow) evade the limits on computability. As 
long as problematic tasks do not necessarily have to be completed, mechanisms such as timeouts 
can avoid the pathological computational cases. 
Many other definitions of intelligence are based on goal seeking behaviour, but living intelligent 
things seek their own goals. Agent/robots, on the other hand, are tools and so their goals derive 
from the needs and desires of humans (and only then their own existence). This apparently small 
distinction means that much of the theory of intelligence does not directly apply to agent/robot 
intelligence. (Asimov’s famous Three Laws of Robotics captured the primacy of human interests 
over robot interests, but failed to take into account the ownership of robots, a point we return to 
below.) 
Definition: An intelligent agent/robot is social if it can infer tasks and their importance based on 
updatable models of the humans around it. 
This definition requires that an agent/robot has a set of models of humans it may or has 
encountered, is proactive in refining and updating these models of humans based on what it sees 
and infers, and does exo-prediction of what these humans want/will do, based on the models. The 
management and updating of these models becomes a major component of its self-generated 
tasks. 
This definition allows a robot that navigates along a busy pavement to be considered a social 
robot, even if it doesn’t interact explicitly or directly with any human, since it must have models 
of how humans move in order to be able to thread its way through them; it will perform better if 
it can infer from the appearance of each human how he or she is likely to move in the immediate 
future; and it will also perform better if it is aware of social conventions such as keeping to the 
right or left. The comparison with self-driving cars is instructive. At present, such cars model 
pedestrians in essentially the same way that they model other vehicles, as moving objects. A 
social self-driving car would be able to infer from the movement of a particular pedestrian that 
he is drunk, and would build this into predictions of his future movements. 
It is also necessary for a robot to have models of other robots since: it will encounter them 
physically (and so must be aware that they, unlike other moving objects, have agency); it must 
collaborate with them to divide up tasks in many plausible settings; and it can learn and teach by 
sharing knowledge and models with them. 
Robots must also have models of other beings with agency, i.e. animals, whose future behaviour 
cannot be fully modelled by information about their recent behaviour. 
This definition of social agent/robot allows for a further, more powerful class of social 
agent/robots, which might perhaps be called verbal social robots or interacting social robots, 
which have the capability of communicating with humans directly. Breazeal (2002) defined 
sociable robots that are quite close to these but required also that they should be lifelike in order 
to leverage human tendencies to anthropomorphism. Sometimes this argument is made along the 
lines of the need to signal human-like affordances via a human-like appearance (Hegel et al. 
2009). However, an agent like HAL in the 2001: A Space Odyssey film seems clearly to be an 
interacting social agent (albeit an evil one) despite the lack of a physical body. Humans manage 
to interact socially with other humans even when disembodied, using the telephone; and with 
limited embodiment, using tools like Skype. It could be argued that humans understand the 
sociality of characters in novels, with no embodiment at all. Thus, the necessity of embodiment 
for social agent/robots is perhaps overestimated. 
Obviously, the ability of an agent/robot to interact with humans using the full range of modalities 
humans use with each other greatly increases the sophistication needed for the interface, and also 
the richness of the models of humans that the robot must construct. 
There is a natural hierarchy of capability in agent/robot systems: locus of interaction, autonomy, 
intelligence, social modelling, and social communication. 
We can also differentiate agent/robots along axes such as: learning (can they acquire new facts, 
or can they also infer new models, or can they also alter their own regulatory system); and 
communication sophistication (must they be instructed directly – programmed – or can they also 
understand imprecise or implicit commands; or can they also infer human desires from their 
models of humans, without any communication) (Billingsley et el. 2017). 
The way we have framed these definitions implies that the software/systems part of a robot is 
necessarily coupled with its physical manifestation. It is conceivable that the ‘soft’ part of a robot 
could migrate to another physical manifestation. This would avoid the need for a robot to go 
from one place to another just because its associated human did. For example, shopping centers 
could provide robot ‘bodies’ that could be occupied by the ‘soft’ part of personal support 
workers accompanying shoppers. However, there are substantial practical difficulties with this 
idea – incompatibilities between the hardware configurations are likely to create bumpy 
experiences of the kind known to those who try to use someone else’s computer (or even a 
different keyboard). 
Examples. 
It is helpful to test these definitions in the space of existing, and readily conceived, systems to 
see how they should be categorised. We illustrate this in the following table. Systems in italics 
do not exist today, but seem reachable within a reasonable time frame. 
 Characteristic 
 
Interaction 
 
AGENTlike 
 
 
ROBOTlike 
fixed carried fixed mobile 
Locus of 
interaction 
no human 
interaction 
network 
switches 
 industrial 
assembly 
automatic 
train; 
robot 
firefighter 
 1-1  Siri etc.; 
augmented 
reality 
glasses; 
paraplegic 
exoskeleton 
  
+Autonomous no human 
interaction 
   UAV 
(in loiter 
mode); 
Mars Rovers; 
bomb 
disposal 
robot 
 1-1    UAV 
(in piloted 
mode) 
+Intelligent no interaction    pipeline 
cleaner; 
warehouse 
management 
robot 
 1-1    self-driving 
car 
(passengers); 
 1-many    self-driving 
car 
(pedestrians) 
+Social 1-1 smart 
information 
kiosk; 
teacher 
augmented 
reality 
glasses 
airport 
check-in 
luggage 
handler 
robot pet; 
home help; 
porter 
 1-many roombot 
(e.g. HAL) 
personal 
lawyer-bot 
 
smart triage health/aged 
interactions 
chaperone; 
security and 
safety; 
delivery-bot 
 
An important differentiator is whether the agent/robot operates without human interaction, 
interacts with a single human (and so is primarily a physical, mental, or social enhancement for 
its user), or interacts with multiple humans simultaneously, and so is truly social. 
There are many empty squares in the table. Exemplars in some of these can be imagined – for 
example, an intelligent agent could patrol the Internet looking for malware and removing it. This 
requires intelligence so that it doesn’t get stuck, computationally and geographically, but does 
not require interaction with humans. It is striking, though, how much both mobility and social 
abilities increase the space of interesting potential exemplars. 
Systems that have a locus of interaction but no other sophisticated properties are the totality of 
those that are considered as robots from a lay perspective, but they are really the simplest 
agent/robot systems. 
Autonomous systems are being developed rapidly, although more within an agent framework 
than a robot framework. Such systems would naturally be improved by adding intelligence. 
Today, the most sophisticated systems that are intelligent function within frameworks that are 
limited physically. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can loiter over a particular 
area for long periods of time, requesting help from a human pilot only when something 
interesting happens. 
It is difficult to assess the functionality of existing social agent/robots. Many presentations of the 
functioning of such systems are scripted; when the results of experiments are reported, they are 
either of limited scope, or scored in opaque ways, or both. 
As the table shows, there are abundant opportunities for social robots to perform useful roles. 
The capabilities required to be social are largely orthogonal to the capabilities required by 
physical embodiment, except that intelligence interacts with mobility because of the need to 
manage power. 
Research Directions 
These definitions suggest at least the following research directions: 
General: 
Building robots requires considerable expense and complexity. Many of the research questions 
being addressed can be done as well within an agent framework. Some examples where progress 
could be made (even though not every question could be answered) include: learning from 
humans and teaching them, collaborative planning, engagement, detecting and transmitting 
emotions and moods, and detecting mental states in humans and simulating them in an agent. 
Much can be adapted from the wider software agent community, but issues of localization, 
embodiment, and close interactions with humans create novel issues. 
Conversely, many of the research questions of mobility and embodiment being addressed can be 
done without the need for much of the social framework. Some examples include: path and 
motion planning, optimal telepresence, reference resolution, and haptic interaction. 
Of course, movement is a key aspect of human sociality, so that these two directions will 
eventually overlap. But perhaps more progress could be made with a reductionist approach. 
Related to autonomy: 
Regulatory systems that understand the difference between commanded tasks and self-generated 
tasks, and can make decisions about the order in which to complete them, are needed. It seems 
necessary to consider a regulatory system as a hierarchy of regulatory systems acting at different 
levels of abstraction. At the top level, the regulatory system decides (from moment to moment) 
the ranking of a set of goals. Each goal consists of a set of tasks; at the next level, the regulatory 
system ranks the available tasks. Each task consists of a set of actions; at the next level the 
regulatory system ranks the actions, and chooses the one to execute. At any time, new input from 
the external environment and the internal state of the robot can change the objects in play and 
their rankings at any or all of these levels of abstraction. For example, in humans reflexes re-
order actions at a very low level, and without necessarily re-ordering higher level tasks, while 
other physiological signals seem to operate by re-ordering tasks or even goals; for example, 
getting hungry. Robots will need to have similar flexibility. Algorithmic approaches to choosing 
what to do next (maximising utility) are typically not framed in this hierarchical way at present, 
although the concept of hierarchical control is an old one (Albus, 1991). For example, the 
popular ROS system provides a single shared space in which both publish-subscribe and remote 
procedure calls operate. Again there is much to be learned from the software agent community, 
but new issues are in play for social agent/robots. 
What repertoire of goals, actions, and tasks are available to an agent/robot, and where do they 
come from? Can the agent/robot create effectively new ones by combining existing ones, or can 
it infer genuinely new ones (i.e. a substantive form of learning)? 
Who has the right to command an agent/robot to acquire a goal, or perform a task, and how are 
conflicts between competing commands to be resolved? Must self-generated tasks always be 
lower priority than commanded tasks, or may an agent/robot refuse to obey a command because 
of its own ‘needs’ (e.g. charging)? Since agent/robots will be expensive for some time, especially 
as their individuality means high marginal costs for each unit, they will have owners who expect 
the agent/robots to serve their specific goals, certainly with higher priorities than requests from 
random human passers-by. 
How can robots agree amongst themselves which is to carry out any particular task in a shared 
context? In human societies, this usually results in some form of specialisation – one individual 
tends to complete particular tasks, even though all are equally capable. In an environment where 
a skill can be encoded and transmitted from one robot to another, does specialisation have a role 
to play? Will agent/robots be mass-produced, or will particular constraints mean that they will be 
highly variable (as cars are today)? 
Related to intelligence: 
If a system is not to get stuck, it must either know before it starts an activity that the activity can 
be completed in a timely way, or it must have a mechanism for bailing out of the activity when it 
becomes clear that it cannot be completed (possibly reconsidering at some higher level and 
starting a new task to achieve the same end). Therefore, intelligence requires a system to predict 
what will happen when any particular goal, task, or action is performed, and a way to compare 
what is actually happening with what was predicted. The simplest form of such a system would 
predict how long each activity should take, and timeout if it has not completed. In humans, the 
cerebellum is responsible for predicting what is supposed to happen as the human moves; a 
similar mechanism seems essential for robot movement; and something similar happens in 
humans as we follow a planned activity. For a robot, it is also essential to predict how much 
power the activity will consume to ensure that it can be done within the context of current 
available power. 
Although intelligent systems need not be social, an awareness of human timeframes, combined 
with the ability to predict the time required for a task, improves usability. In current systems, it is 
easy for a user to begin a computation that takes far longer than anticipated; flagging this in 
advance would prevent wasted work and time. (Of course, prediction of required time is not 
possible in the general case, but is for most practical purposes.) Software that takes 1s, 10s, 100s, 
1000s (=16 min), 10,000s (=3 hours), or 100,000s (=30 hours) cause quite different interaction 
behaviour with humans. It would be useful to expose the system’s understanding of estimated 
time for tasks to users. 
Related to social interaction: 
The key requirement is to be able to build models of humans that are rich enough to have an 
effective impact on goal, task, and action generation and ranking. Such models can vary in 
complexity. The simplest might be a movement model that predicts velocity from visual factors 
such as height and weight; a more complex model might recognise faces and so remember which 
humans have been met before; a still more complex model might estimate properties of 
individuals such as interests, roles, attitudes, and personality. The goal of research is to allow the 
agent/robot to build models of humans that are similar to those that humans build of other 
humans. As an extension, robots also need to build models of other robots and animals, with the 
same range of possible complexities. 
The second research challenge is to define and build the techniques for enabling these models of 
humans to influence the agent/robot’s goals, tasks, and actions. Conceptually this requires the 
agent/robot to be able to perceive the goal-task-action priorities of humans and compute the 
feedback loops between them and its own goal-task-action priorities. At the simplest level this 
requires not running into or hitting an adjacent human who is also moving. At its most 
sophisticated, this requires implementing the general concept of ‘being helpful’, that is, assisting 
the human to achieve his or her goals. 
A third research challenge is to define a legal system for humans and robots to interact. Many of 
the problems associated with self-driving cars also apply to social robots: who is responsible 
when a robot injures a human? Can robots (in security or care settings) force humans to do things 
they don’t want to? Must robots always be truthful? If a corporation can be a legal person, can a 
robot be one too? Although Asimov explored the implications of his Three Laws extensively, 
there remain many difficult edge cases, and he did not allow full force to ownership, and by 
implication control, of a robot. 
Research in social robotics is surprisingly fragmented, with little sense of the roadmap of 
problems that must be solved, and their necessary sequencing. The contribution of this paper is 
to suggest both problems that seem to be understudied and potentially fruitful directions for 
further work. 
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